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INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether an employer should be allowed to exclude Spanish,
or any other language, from the workplace based on an employer's preference
for English in the workplace presents an interesting public policy consideration.
An English-only rule creates public policy concerns for the supporters of anti-
discrimination or diversity related to the terms and conditions of employment.
This Article advances the argument that a law or policy that prohibits discrimi-
nation in the workplace based on an employer's preference for English-only
encourages cultural diversity. An English-only preference that is not job
related or justified by business necessity rejects cultural diversity and sets in
motion the ethnic or racial hostility often associated with the language one
speaks. There have been several civil rights cases involving plaintiffs that were
fired from their jobs for speaking Spanish in an English-only environment.
"Discrimination was once aimed at... the exclusion of all racial minori-
ties."' According to Kenji Yoshino, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 anti-discrimi-
nation provision has made such categorical exclusions by employers very rare
in 2006.2
Today, a new form of discrimination has replaced the race-based group
exclusion.3 This new form of discrimination identifies the member of a group
that declines to accept the opportunity to assimilate to dominant cultural
norms.4 Yoshino asserts that current civil rights laws fail to protect employees
against the requirement that they "assimilate to dominant norms."5 Although
* Associate Dean and Roberson King Professor; Texas Southern University: B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I extend a special word of thanks to my wife and our children for
their support. I would like to thank my colleague at Thurgood Marshall Law School
Assistant Professor Sally Green and my research assistants Monique Alexander and Nikeyla
Johnson, class of 2008, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, for their comments on earlier
drafts of this article. Professor Weeden discussed the impact of an English-only rule in the
workplace as a work in progress at the First Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in
Labor & Employment Law at Marquette University Law School on Saturday, October 28,
2006. The colloquium offers an opportunity for labor and employment law scholars from
around the country to present their works in progress to get feedback from their colleagues.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the colloquium for their helpful feedback.
I Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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speaking English in the workplace is a dominant norm in America, the issue
presented is whether an English-only rule in the workplace that is not job
related or based on a business necessity is a type of overt discrimination that
should be tolerated to accommodate an employer's preference for English.
English-only rules in the workplace that are not job related or supported by a
legitimate business justification unnecessarily impair society's interest in
becoming a culturally diverse society. The law, as a matter of sound public
policy, should prohibit English-only rules that simply accommodate an
employer's preference and that unreasonably place a burden on America's
interest in promoting cultural diversity.
Part I discusses the implication of an English-only rule as a proxy for
promoting hostility towards an immigrant while undermining society's commit-
ment to diversity. Part II asserts that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes
language rights protection for workplace speakers discriminated against
because of their national origin.
Part III presents an analysis of Garcia v. Gloor's impact on English-only
workplace rules under Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrimi-
nation. Part IV contends that the EEOC's guidelines, which presume that the
English-only rule creates a presumption of national origin discrimination when
it is not job related, should be given deference under a proper interpretation of
Griggs' disparate impact theory. Part V argues that, independent of the EEOC
guidelines addressing the issue of English-only rules, the rationale of the
Griggs opinion requires lower courts to reject the Gloor decision because it is a
self-evident truth that any English-only rule affects people of a national origin
who prefer not to speak English. Part VI explores the Tenth Circuit's require-
ment that an employer demonstrate a legitimate business necessity for an
English-only rule in order to defeat the presumption that the English-only rule
creates a hostile work environment.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENGLISH-ONLY RULES AS A PROXY FOR
PROMOTING HOSTILITY TOWARD IMMIGRANTS WHILE UNDERMINING
SOCIETY'S COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY
In today's culture, some want to make English the legal official language
of the United States. Culturally English is America's dominant language, but
English has never been certified as America's official language by Congress. It
may prove very difficult to persuade Congress to enact legislation requiring
employers to demonstrate that an English-only rule has to be job related.
English-only rules in the workplace that do not serve a job related justification
should be prohibited because English-only rules are often a poorly disguised
proxy for a community's animus toward undocumented immigration.
New Jersey voters residing in Bogota in Bergen County went to the polls
in November 2006 to support an ordinance adopting English as the official
language of the borough.6 Bogota's mayor said that this vote was needed "to
re-establish the fact that English is the official language of this country, while
6 Jennifer Weiss, Making English Official Is on the Ballot in Bogota, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2006, § 14, at 2.
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maybe not by law, certainly by heritage." 7 New Jersey is not currently among
the twenty-seven states with English as the official language provisions,
according to U.S. English, a group campaigning to make English America's
official language.8 In May of 2006, the United States Senate approved an
amendment to immigration legislation that would name English as the official
national language.9 Under existing federal law, the Bogota English as the offi-
cial language ballot will appear on the ballot in English and Spanish.'°
It is difficult sometimes to get current policy makers to think pragmati-
cally about promoting cultural diversity through language. The issue of lin-
guistic diversity developed prior to the American Revolution.'' In 1753,
Benjamin Franklin articulated anxiety about calling for interpreters in Penn-
sylvania because the state had a significant number of German settlers. 12 In
addition, "Franklin [objected to] German schools, German newspapers, and
German street signs."' 3 The United States had not adopted an official lan-
guage.' 4 The Continental Congress safeguarded multilingualism by not pro-
claiming English as America's official language and by issuing important
documents, "including the Articles of Confederation, in German and French." '"
However, the practice of multilingualism in America has always been
incoherent. 16
Arizona's Democratic governor and its Republican-controlled legislature
have entered a stalemate over teaching English in the state's public schools.
17
The decision in Arizona to forbid bilingual education in public schools is
unmistakably a substitute for the immigration dispute.' 8 Arizona's Governor,
Janet Napolitano, concedes that there is a significant amount of anti-immigrant
sentiment in the legislature right now: "[Legislators] are angry about the tax-
payer dollars that are being used to educate illegal immigrants or the children
of illegal immigrants."' 9 It appears that some in Arizona believe that forcing
the children of undocumented immigrants to speak only English in school may
deter undocumented immigration into the state. 21 One of the challenges in con-
vincing courts and legislatures to prohibit English-only rules that are not work-
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
'o Id. "This point was not lost on the mayor. 'This ballot question is going to appear in two
languages,' Mr. Lonegan said, 'and I find that amusing.'" Id.
11 Lori A. McMullen & Charlene R. Lynde, The "Official English" Movement and The
Demise of Diversity: The Elimination of Federal Judicial and Statutory Minority Language
Rights, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 789, 790 (1997) (citing James C. Stalker, Official English
or English Only, in THE REFERENCE SHELF 44, 44-52 (Bee Gallegos ed., 1994)).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 790-91 (citing Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1992)).
16 Id. at 791.
17 John M. Broder, Immigration Issue Plays Out in Arizona Education Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2006, at A] 6.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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related is the unsupported assumption by some that any worker who wants to
speak Spanish or another language at work cannot speak English, and the
employee is apparently presumed to be an undocumented immigrant. How-
ever, that assumption is flawed because if the employee who wants to speak
Spanish in the workplace is generally presumed to be an undocumented immi-
grant, then the employer must equally be presumed to engage in the practice of
hiring undocumented immigrants as employees in violation of federal immigra-
tion laws.2 '
Whether English-only rules in the workplace serve as a popular proxy to
prohibit those perceived to be undocumented immigrants from threatening
America's identity as an English-speaking country is a fair question. However,
America's current immigration and naturalization laws grant citizenship to
immigrants who do. not have the ability to speak English if the immigrant meets
the age prerequisite or the disability requirement.2 2 The reasonable inference
from the immigration and naturalization laws is that Congress does not equate
the ability to speak English with the loyalty necessary to become an American
citizen. After these immigrants become citizens without an understanding of
the English language because of the age exemption,23 these non-English speak-
ing citizens have a right to enter the workforce in order to support themselves
21 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1) (2000). "It is unlawful for a person or other entity -
(A) to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing
the alien is an unauthorized alien (as defined in subsection (h)(3) of this section) with respect to
such employment, or
(B) (i) to hire for employment in the United States an individual without complying with the
requirements of subsection (b) of this section or (ii) if the person or entity is an agricultural
association, agricultural employer, or farm labor contractor (as defined in section 1802 of Title
29), to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an individual
without complying with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section.
22 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (2000).
(a) No person except as otherwise provided in this subchapter shall hereafter be naturalized as a
citizen of the United States upon his own application who cannot demonstrate (1) an understand-
ing of the English language, including an ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary
usage in the English language ....
(b)(1) The requirements of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any person who is
unable because of physical or developmental disability or mental impairment to comply there-
with ... (2) The requirement of subsection (a)(1) of this section shall not apply to any person
who, . . . (A) is over fifty years of age and has been living in the United States for periods
totaling at least twenty years subsequent to a lawful admission for permanent residence, or (B) is
over fifty-five years of age and has been living in the United States for periods totaling at least
fifteen years subsequent to a lawful admission for permanent residence.
(emphasis added).
Subsection (a)(3) provides that
The Attorney General, pursuant to regulations, shall provide for special consideration, as deter-
mined by the Attorney General, concerning the requirement of subsection (a)(2) of this section
with respect to any person who ...is over sixty-five years of age and has been living in the
United States for periods totaling at least twenty years subsequent to a lawful admission for
permanent residence.
23 Id. A person who is over fifty and who has resided lawfully in the United States at least
fifteen years may qualify to be naturalized as a citizen of the United States without an under-
standing of the English language.
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
and their families. Under federal law an immigrant may become a lawful citi-
zen without the ability to speak English.2 4
English fluency is a hot-button subject in the United States debate about
immigration a.2  Advocates of English-only rules insist immigrants "endanger
America's English-speaking identity. ' 2 6 In April of 2006, President Bush said
that the national anthem, the Star-Spangled Banner, "should only be sung and
recorded in English." 27 The U.S. Senate immigration bill contains two amend-
ments: one proclaims that English is the national language and another
acknowledges English as America's "common and unifying tongue. ' 28 Those
language specific amendments were "instantly denounced by opponents as
either racist or anti-Hispanic. '"29 Advocates of English only hope to affect
immigration policies by discouraging immigrants from transplanting their old
culture rather than assimilating into the American culture.3 ° Supporters of the
English- only movement contend that Latin Americans immigrating to Texas
from countries that once were part of either Spain or Mexico prefer to transport
their culture rather than assimilate into the U.S. culture.3'
An English-only rule in the workplace is not an effective means to deter
undocumented immigrants from entering the workplace in the United States.
The English-only rules in the workplace should not have any effect on the
hiring decisions of those employers who are already complying with federal
law making the employment of unauthorized immigrants unlawful. However,
the English-only rules in the workplace may serve as a very practical cover for
an employer hiring an undocumented immigrant because the general public
may be more likely to conclude that an immigrant who speaks English in the
workplace is lawfully employed.
The "stars are aligned" for a new group to become the target of angry
Americans because of its national origin.32 While "two-thirds of Americans
believe that [the United States] is on the wrong track," it is no surprise that the
historical tool of blaming unpopular immigrants is being utilized. 33 The histor-
ical response to a feeling that America is on the wrong track is to engage in a
"witch hunt for scapegoats."3 4 Because gay people are no longer the surefire
24 Id.
25 Lori Rodriguez, Translating a Need, Language Barriers, Immigrants See English as
Vital, but Work, Family Limit Time to Learn, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2006, at Al.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
3" Id. See also Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual
Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1345-46 (1987) (explaining that the
English-only movement evolved from concerns that immigrants were no longer assimilating
into American culture).
32 Frank Rich, Op-Ed., How Hispanics Became the New Gays, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006,
§ 4, at 12.
33 Id.
34 Id.; Valerie L. Barth, Comment, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the Judiciary:
A Proposal for Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 105. 128-29 (1997).
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scapegoats, Hispanics became political scapegoats in the 2006 election. 35 Con-
gress has turned immigration reform into a culture war.36 The current ugly
immigration debate has produced a backlash against Hispanics as an at-risk
minority group.3 7
High profile politicians and public figures are "embracing a nativism and
xenophobia" similar to the type this nation experienced in the 1920s "when the
State Department's [concerns] about the influx of 'filthy' and 'unassimilable'
Jews [entering America] from Eastern Europe" inspired America to adopt its
first immigration quota.3 8 In the 1950s, a hostile deportation scheme called
"Operation Wetback" was used to demean and insult undocumented Mexican
workers by referring to them as "wetbacks." 39 Fox News anchor Brit Hume
described immigrant demonstrators waving Mexican flags as a "repellent spec-
tacle" in April of 2006.40 After being informed of a Spanish version of the Star
Spangled Banner, Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee introduced a Senate
resolution requesting that the national anthem be sung in English only.4 ' One
commentator contends that Hume and Alexander intended to stir up animosity
against Hispanics as an enemy of the American civilization.4 2 John B. Judis of
The New Republic says the dominant fear in Arizona "has less to do with immi-
grants stealing jobs . . . than with [Hispanic immigrants] contaminating the
culture by way of 'Mexicanization.' "4 "It's the same complaint that's been
leveled against every immigrant group when the country is in this foul a
mood," according to Frank Rich. 44
Individuals use Title VII as a means for legal redress when discriminated
against in the workplace. The legal avenue of Title VII national origin should
be used to apply the job relatedness test to an English-only rule in the work-
place. A pragmatic view of the Title VII provision granting protection to indi-
viduals against discrimination because of national origin, makes it clear that
when America is in a "foul immigration mood" it will use English-only rules in
the workplace and beyond as a proxy against specific immigrants because of
either the real or perceived identity of their national origin. Employees often
feel disadvantaged when an "English-only rule ... require[s] that employees
speak only English in the workplace at specific times during the work day"
regardless of whether the requirement is job related.45 Sometimes a plaintiff
objects to an English-only rule as a violation of Title VII by alleging that
" Rich, supra note 32.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.; see also Nancy Cervantes, Sasha Khokha, & Bobbie Murray, Hate Unleashed: Los
Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995)
(using Operation Wetback as evidence of hostility towards Mexicans and those of Mexican
ancestry).
40 Rich, supra note 32.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Raechel L. Adams, Comment, English-Only in the Workplace: A New Judicial Lens Will
Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1998)
(citing Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (a Hispanic
[Vol. 7:947
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English-only rules unfairly segregate employees based on their national ori-
gin.46 Title VII plaintiffs appropriately allege that the close connection
between foreign nationality and foreign language creates an atmosphere4 7 in
the workplace where an English-only rule disproportionately and unfairly
affects people of foreign origin.48
II. TITLE VII OF THE CivIL RIGHTS ACT INCLUDES LANGUAGE RIGHTS
PROTECTION FOR WORKPLACE SPEAKERS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BECAUSE
OF THEIR NATIONAL ORIGIN
Linda M. Mealey and other commentators properly interpreted Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act as protection for the language rights of individuals
who are denied the right to speak their native language because of their national
origin.4 9 Congress enacted Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination
based on national origin.5 ° Title VII is designed to promote equality in
employment opportunity by removing language barriers that serve as a proxy
for discriminating against employees because of their national origin. 51 Title
VII fails to define clearly the expression "national origin" or the scope of the
rights granted under the national origin provision.5 2 National origin discrimi-
nation should, at a minimum under Title VII, include discrimination against an
employee by an employer because of the country from which an individual or
an individual's ancestors came.5 3 Title VII makes it illegal to discriminate
against employees because of national origin.5 4 As an extension of this protec-
tion, an employee should have a right to speak in her primary language or any
preferred language in the American workplace even though there is no specific
language rights provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 55
disk jockey contended that complying with his employer's rule to stop speaking Spanish
would remove his ethnic identity)).
46 Id. (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980); noting that in Gloor, a
"Mexican American lumber salesman challenged English-only rule as discriminatory
because it denied him the right to converse in the language most familiar to him"; and
providing that "in Gloor, the plaintiff argued that his language preference was grounded in
his national origin. See id. Other plaintiffs have alleged that English-only rules discriminate
on the basis of race."). Id. at 1329-30 n.15.
47 Id. at 1329-30.
48 Id. at 1330 (citing Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Va.
1995); and noting that "bank employees of Hispanic origin claimed national origin discrimi-
nation and harassment because they were afraid to speak their native language once the bank
instituted an English-only policy." Id. at 1330 n.17.
19 Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clarifying
National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory Under Title VII, 894 F. Supp.
933, 396-97 n.30 (1989) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78
Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000))).
50 Id. at 397 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)).
51 Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 397-98 n.35 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt)).
54 Id. at 398 n.39.
-5 Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right To Speak One's Primary Language In
The Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 266 (1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2000)).
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In 1980, the Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. Gloor, held that a rule limiting an
employee's use of Spanish while working did not implicate Title VII.56 How-
ever, eight years later, in 1988, the Ninth Circuit decided in Gutierrez v. Munic-
ipal Court, that a similar rule restricting the use of Spanish constituted national
origin discrimination and was prohibited by Title VII.57 Subsequently, in Gar-
cia v. Spun Steak Co., a 1993 case, the Ninth Circuit reversed its earlier posi-
tion by holding that English-only rules in the workplace did not constitute
national origin discrimination under Title VII. 58 Although the Supreme Court
has not yet considered the permissibility of English-only rules in the workplace
under Title VII, the Supreme Court will eventually have to resolve this impor-
tant English-only issue under Title VII.
59
The Supreme Court has yet to address the merits of whether English-only
rules in the workplace that do not serve any business purpose are permissible
under Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination. Unfortu-
nately, Title VII fails to protect an employee explicitly against discrimination
based on the language he speaks. According to Professor Juan Perea, "[tihe
fundamental question, therefore, is whether a person's primary language war-
rants protection under Title VII as an aspect of national origin."'60 Courts and
commentators properly conclude that the national origin provision in Title VII
is broad enough to grant employees protection against language based discrimi-
nation that often serves as a proxy for national origin discrimination. 6'
English-only litigation under Title VII is engaged in an uphill battle in the
courts in spite of the EEOC's guidelines that clearly state that language dis-
crimination may be properly considered as a legal cause of national origin
discrimination.62
Thirty-seven years ago the EEOC's examples of national origin discrimi-
nation in its general guideline failed to establish the needed "link between lan-
guage and national origin" discrimination according to the analysis of one
court.63 The court concluded that the omission of the word "language" in Title
VII's statutory definition indicated that Congress did not intend for a discrimi-
56 Id. at 268-69. (citing Gloor v. Garcia, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981)).
17 Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of Se. Judicial Dist. County of Los Angeles, 838 F.2d
1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, Mun. Ct. of Se. Judicial Dist. County of Los Angeles
v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989)).
58 Lisa L. Behm, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title VII: The Need for Judicial
Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 569, 585 (1998) (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir.
1993)).
'9 Perea, supra note 55, at 266.
60 Id. at 273.
61 See id. at 273-76.
The courts have construed 'national origin' broadly to include characteristics that are correlated
with national origin. Several courts, for example, have concluded that an employee's foreign
accent, provided that it does not interfere with the employee's ability to perform his job duties, is
not a legitimate justification for discrimination under Title VII.
Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
62 See Adams, supra note 45, at 1331-33.
63 Id. at 1331-32.
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nation claim to be premised on foreign language.64 The court also made its
ruling without the benefit of EEOC guidance on the link between national ori-
gin discrimination.6 5
The EEOC guideline on national origin discrimination currently provides
that discrimination because of national origin includes "the denial of equal
employment opportunity ... because an individual has the ... linguistic char-
acteristics of a national origin group.'"66 Although courts might accept that
national origin may include language discrimination, plaintiffs still face an
uphill battle in challenging an employer's English-only rule under the scope of
Title VII.
6 7
One commentator notes that even when the EEOC guidelines give rise to a
presumption that a specific English-only rule is tantamount to national origin
discrimination, the Ninth Circuit still requires plaintiffs to produce evidence
supporting their specific claim of discrimination. 68 The EEOC's expansive
interpretation of Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination
appropriately includes protection against language discrimination. 69 The opin-
ion held that Title VII's national origin discrimination does not prohibit apply-
ing an arbitrary English-only workplace rule to a bilingual employee. The
Gloor opinion conflicts with the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII's prohibi-
tion against national origin discrimination and the protection it offers a bilin-
gual employee from an employer's subjective rule prohibiting speaking
Spanish. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., the Ninth Circuit "explicitly rejected the
presumption of discriminatory impact created by an English-only rule under the
EEOC Guideline. '70 The Ninth Circuit "refused to defer to [the EEOC's]
administrative agency's statutory interpretation" because it believed that the
presumptive interpretation disregarded congressional intent.7' The court
explained that the EEOC presumption of discriminatory impact Guideline for
an English- only rule was inconsistent with Congress' express intent to "pre-
serve employer prerogative in management decisions. 72
Many scholars perceive the critical split in authority concerning the analy-
sis of English-only rules is based on the burden shifting responsibilities of the
Title VII litigants.73 The EEOC Guideline seems to place the opening burden
on the employer to present a legitimate justification for an English-only rule,
while the court in Spun Steak went along with a traditional view of disparate
impact case law and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, placing on the employee the
first burden of proving that the employer's English-only rule has had a discrim-
inatory impact.74
64 Id. at 1332 (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1980)).
65 Id.
66 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1606.1 (2006)).
67 Id. at 1332-33.
68 Id. at 1333.
69 Behm, supra note 58, at 574.
70 Adams, supra note 45, at 1347 (citation omitted).
71 Id. (citation omitted).
72 Id. (citation omitted).
73 Id. (citation omitted).
71 Id. (citation omitted).
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III. WE MUST MARCH AWAY FROM THE RATIONALE OF GARCIA V. GLooR
More than twenty-five years ago in Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit
rejected plaintiff Garcia's well-founded claim that the employer's English-only
rule was hostile to his right to communicate in Spanish in the workplace.75
Congress failed to identify the specific elements that constituted national origin
discrimination under Title VII, and the issue of whether Congress intended to
make language an element of national origin discrimination has not received an
authoritative answer from the Supreme Court.7 6
A. Facts
A detailed discussion of the facts in the Gloor opinion will reveal that a
bilingual employee's refusal to speak English in the workplace was a signifi-
cant factor in the employer's decision to fire him. Because of the heavy reli-
ance on the rationale of Gloor by several courts in denying a bilingual
employee language rights protection under Title VII national origin provision,
recounting the Gloor facts is appropriate.
Hector Garcia completed through the first semester of tenth grade in a
Texas public school.7 7 He is fluent in English and Spanish.78 Although Garcia
was born in the United States, he always spoke Spanish at home.79 In 1975,
Gloor Lumber and Supply, Inc. ("Gloor") hired Garcia as a salesperson. Garcia
won praise from management because of his work and received a bonus of
$250. On the other hand, evidence also revealed that Garcia's work perform-
ance was less than satisfactory. 8" Gloor's rule did not allow employees to
speak Spanish on the job unless they were speaking to Spanish-speaking shop-
pers. A majority of Gloor's employees were bilingual, but several who worked
in the lumberyard could not speak English.8" The English-only rule did not
apply to the Spanish speaking employees who worked outside.82 The English-
only rule also did not apply to work break discussions.83 Garcia testified that
Spanish is his primary language and for that reason the English-only rule was a
hardship.84 The facts suggest that the English-only rule was difficult for Garcia
because it created an internal cultural struggle for him. Garcia testified that
when he was asked by another Mexican-American employee concerning an
item sought by a customer, he answered in Spanish that the item was not avail-
able. 85 Alton Gloor, an officer of Gloor, overheard the communication in
Spanish. Subsequently, Garcia was fired for not speaking English.86
75 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
76 Behm, supra note 58 at 573.
77 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 266.
4 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Garcia was acceptably
discharged because of several deficiencies.87 Those flaws included the follow-
ing failures: a lack of current inventory, not following procedure for replenish-
ing the stock on display, not keeping his area clean, and not following the
English-only rule.88 In spite of the fact that the English-only rule was not
strictly enforced, Garcia violated the rule.89
Gloor offered four business reasons for the English speaking rules.90
First, English-speaking customers disapproved of conversations between Span-
ish speaking employees that they did not comprehend. Second, because the
pamphlets and trade literature were written in English rather than Spanish,
employees engaged in selling should be fluent in English for reasons other than
having conversations with English-speaking customers. Third, if employees
who spoke Spanish as a primary language off the job were required to speak
English only on the job, they would improve their English. Fourth, the
English-only rule allows supervisors who do not speak Spanish to oversee the
work of their bilingual subordinates.
The appellate court approved of the district court's holding that these four
reasons constituted a valid business justification for Garcia's discharge.9' The
Fifth Circuit in Gloor accepted the district court's conclusion that Garcia's dis-
charge was based on a business justification and not national origin discrimina-
tion.92 As an employee Garcia had entered an employment contract with
Gloor. Garcia contended before the EEOC that an English-only rule created a
discriminatory condition of employment because it interfered with his freedom
to contract on the same terms as Whites.93
The EEOC supported Garcia's argument that English-only rules violate
Title VII as well as the right to enter contracts on the same terms as Whites
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) that
make it a conspiracy to interfere with one's civil rights.94
B. Fifth Circuit's Rationale
The Fifth Circuit in Gloor saw the issue as simply deciding whether an
English-only rule, as applied to Garcia, created a discriminatory condition of
employment prohibited by Title VII.95 The Fifth Circuit's treatment of the rel-
evant issue in Gloor was misplaced. The plaintiff in Gloor was not merely
raising a generalized grievance of discrimination about the terms and condi-
tions of his employment. A proper characterization of the issue in Gloor asks
whether Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination in
employment applies to an English-only rule that forbids a bilingual employee,
born in the United States, from speaking Spanish, his primary language, in the
87 Id.
88 Id. at 266-67.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 267.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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workplace when the employer has offered pretextual business reasons for the
English-only rule.
In Gloor, the Fifth Circuit failed to frame the issue properly because it
wrongly rejected the self-evident truth that under either Title VII, or a common
understanding in both North America and South America, one's national origin
is often closely linked with the primary language one is taught to speak. A
person is not given a choice about the primary language he learns from his
parents. Because one's primary language is so closely connected with both
national identity and family identity, a bilingual employee should not be forced
to choose between his primary language and English, unless the employer can
demonstrate that there is no equally effective alternative to achieving his busi-
ness purpose other than requiring the employee to speak English. The Fifth
Circuit correctly stated that language could operate as a concealed basis for
national origin discrimination, but it failed to realize that Gloor applied the
English-only rule to Garcia in this manner.9 6
Twenty-one years after the Gloor opinion, a case involving a similar chal-
lenge to an English-only rule by a resident plaintiff born in New Jersey who
alleged that both Spanish and English were her primary languages, appeared
before the court in Rosario v. Cacace.9 7 A New Jersey state court held that the
plaintiff failed to prove a case of discrimination based on national origin or
ancestry under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD").98
Although the Gloor opinion predated the adoption of the EEOC guidelines for
an employer's English-only rule, its refusal to recognize language discrinina-
tion as prohibited by Title VII's national origin provision became the majority
judicial rule, rather than the EEOC guidelines that recognize that under certain
circumstances an English-only rule may violate Title VII's national origin pro-
vision. Without the benefit of reliable scientific data, the Gloor court con-
cluded that a bilingual employee was obligated to obey an employer's language
rule because it is simply a matter of language preference for a bilingual. 99 The
Gloor court took the position that a bilingual employee could very easily com-
ply with the English-only rule by simply deferring his or her preference for
speaking Spanish in the workplace, rather than English as requested by the
employer. 00
IV. THE EEOC's GUIDELINES THAT PRESUME THAT AN ENGLISH-ONLY
RULE CREATES A PRESUMPTION OF NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
WHEN IT Is NOT JOB RELATED SHOULD BE GIVEN DEFERENCE BECAUSE OF
THE IMPACT OF CODE SWITCHING AND A PROPER INTERPRETATION OF
GRIGGS' DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
It is my view that a proper construction of the disparate impact analysis
under Griggs'° ' demonstrates that an employer may not use an English-only
96 Id.
97 767 A.2d 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
98 Id. at 1027.
99 Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269.
100 Id.
10l 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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rule without meeting the business necessity or job relatedness test independent
of the EEOC guidelines.10 2 In 1980, when Gloor was decided, the EEOC had
not adopted a regulation regarding English-only rules or any general policy
prohibiting them.'0 3 On May 22, 1980, the day Gloor was decided, the EEOC
had reflected on the issue of whether a policy barring the use of the Spanish
language in regular interoffice communications discriminates on the basis of
national origin, but the EEOC had not implemented a regulation or a general
policy based on the national origin statute prohibiting an employer from elimi-
nating the use of the Spanish language in the workplace." Without the benefit
of any EEOC guidelines addressing the issue of an employer requiring that
English be spoken on the job by employees, the Gloor court approached the
English-only problem on the basis of its understanding of the national origin
provision in the statute itself and the existing case law. 10 5 The EEOC publi-
cized its guidelines on the English-only rule seven months after the Gloor deci-
sion on December 30, 1980 and cited the Gloor opinion.'0 6 Because the ruling
in Gloor came before the EEOC's formal guidelines regarding English-only
rules,'0 7 the Gloor opinion should be superseded by the post-Gloor EEOC pol-
icy disagreeing with the holding in Gloor.10 8 One commentator, Lisa L. Behm,
agrees with David Wiley's conclusion that the Gloor opinion and its rationale
should be rejected in favor of giving deference to the applicable EEOC guide-
lines on English only in the workplace."9
The EEOC regulations provide that a rule demanding that employees
speak only English at all times while in the workplace is a burdensome term
and condition of employment. 11o The primary language a person speaks is time
and again a fundamental national origin attribute. A rule prohibiting employees
in the workplace from speaking their primary language places that employee at
a disadvantage, regarding employment opportunities, because of his national
origin."' An employer rule requiring an employee to speak English at all
times produces "an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation"
because of an employee's national origin, which may well stimulate a discrimi-
natory working environment." 2 Consequently, the EEOC presumes that an
English-only rule violates Title VII. 1 3 An employer could have a rule com-
manding employees to speak only in English at specific times if the employer
can prove that the rule is "justified by business necessity."' 14 It is a widespread
practice for "individuals whose primary language is not English to inadver-
102 See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2006).
103 Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 n.1.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 David T. Wiley, Whose Proof?: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Disparate Impact
Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539, 557 n.105 (1995).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 557 n.106.
109 Behm, supra note 58, at 583 n.117.
l"0 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2006).
ill Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b).
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tently switch speaking English to speaking [in] their primary language."' 5 An
employer with a business necessity for speaking English only at specific times
has a duty to inform its employees of the common circumstances when speak-
ing in English is required and of the consequences for violating the speak
English at specific time rule.1 16 An employer that fails to notify its employees
effectively of its rule, and takes adverse employment action against an
employee based on a violation of the rule, produces incriminating "evidence of
discrimination on the basis of national origin." '117
Gloor was decided before extensive research revealed the impact of lin-
guistics on bilingual people. 1 8 According to experts, the ability to change
back and forth from English to another language is not simply a matter of
preference for bilingual individuals whose primary language is not English.' 19
The process of going back and forth from English to one's primary language is
called "code switching." 2 ° Code switching has been established as more of an
unconscious act than a conscious act for a speaker returning to his or her pri-
mary language. 12 1 Multilingual individuals who have acquired two or more
languages as a child regularly and unconsciously switch between languages
when speaking to members of their primary cultural unit.122 A study of bil-
inguals in the United States discovered that bilingual speakers habitually are
not aware that they are alternating between two languages. 12 3 Studies reveal
bilingual people engage in code switching "in order to achieve certain commu-
nicative goals and convey socio-semantic connotations."' 124 The majority rule
upholding English-only rules because they are simply an issue of preference for
the typical bilingual speakers is not supported by research addressing the code
switching theory.
125
In Rosario v. Cacace, a New Jersey state court stated that Gloor is now
the established majority judicial rule under Title VII of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act. 126 Under the Gloor rationale, adopted by a majority of fed-
eral courts, an English-only rule does not violate Title VII's national origin
provision because of the presumption that an English-only rule can unhesitat-
... Id. § 1606.7(c).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Mark Col6n, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke:
English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227,
250 (2002) (citing Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(expert testimony of Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson)).
123 Id. (citing Alfredo Mirandg, Now That I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar ("I'm Not
Allowed to Speak"): The Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANo-LATINo L.
REV. 115, 146 (1996) (quoting EINAR HAUGEN, THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE IN AMERICA 65
(1969))).
124 Id. (quoting Hans Dua, Perspectives on Code-Switching Research, 12 INT'L J. DRUIDIAN
LINGUISTICS 136, 136-37 (1984)).
125 Id. at 251 (citing Nancy Faires Conklin & Margaret A. Lourie, A Host of Tongues:
Language Communities in the United States 6 (1983)).
126 Rosario v. Cacace, 767 A.2d 1023, 1029 (N.J. Super. Ct. A.D. 2001).
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ingly be observed by a fully bilingual employee and nonobservance is just a
question of individual preference. ' 27 Professor James Leonard correctly asserts
that most important to a court's dismissal of language discrimination claims
under Title VII is the false conclusion that a bilingual worker may freely decide
to speak English.128 In EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., a federal
district court in Texas rejected the majority view that a bilingual exercises a
free choice in speaking her language. 129 The court accepted the EEOC expert
testimony that linguistic code switching denied bilinguals a freedom of choice
in speaking opportunities. 3 ' "The significance of code switching is obvious:
to the extent that bilinguals involuntarily revert to their primary language, their
behaviors resemble the immutable traits that fall within the anti-discrimination
model." 131
However, Professor Leonard properly concludes that language is a muta-
ble cultural characteristic because in practice it does not actually function like
the inescapable stereotype of race or gender because language use is primarily
within a person's control in spite of the fact that bilinguals will sometimes use
their primary language involuntarily.' 32 The physical traits of race or gender
are different from the language that evolves within national origin groups.'
3 3
According to Professor Leonard, the key difference between race or gender and
language is that the language of a culture may change as result of environmen-
tal factors while the essentially physical characteristic of skin color or gender of
a group is perpetual.' 34 Although language may not be an immutable charac-
teristic, it is the essential fabric of identifying cultural and national origin such
that an employer should not be permitted to restrict its use without first demon-
strating that its English-only rule is related to job performance. By concluding
that language is not an immutable characteristic like skin color, I do not intend
to suggest that language rights are entitled to less protection than skin color. I
think national origin language discrimination and skin color discrimination are
equally suspect and should be given similar protection under the law.
Under the code switching theory, one's primary language has such a
predominate influence on the language one speaks that a bilingual person
sometimes involuntarily lapses into his native language under circumstances
where the English-only rule requires an employee to speak English. Because
the primary language of a bilingual employee has such a dominant influence on
him, he is not aware of the fact that he has involuntarily lapsed into his native
language. It is fundamentally unfair to allow an employer's arbitrary English-
127 Id.
128 James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims For Language Discrimina-
tion in the Workplace, 38 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 57, 121 (2004).
129 Id. (citing EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1066-70 (N.D.
Tex. 2000). The expert witness was Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, a professor of linguistics,
Spanish language and culture at the University of Pittsburgh. Id. at 121 n.339.
130 Id.
'"' Id. at 122.
132 Id. at 125.
13 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §1606.1 (2006) (EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
National Origin) (noting that national origin groups have physical, cultural, and linguistic
characteristics)).
134 Leonard, supra note 128, at 126.
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only requirement, that is not job related, to be used as a tool to discharge an
employee for speaking his primary language on an involuntarily basis. Mr.
Garcia, a bilingual, chose consciously to speak Spanish rather than English at
work. The employer's rule allowed Garcia to speak Spanish during work
breaks.135 In Gloor, the court said that there was no authority presented that
grants a person a legally cognizable right to speak Spanish or any other specific
language at work.136 The rules of the workplace may be established by the
employer unless those rules are restricted by statute or other relevant legal prin-
ciples.' 3 7 The rejection of applicants for employment who cannot speak
English may well be discriminatory if the job can be performed by a person
lacking the ability to speak English.' 38
V. INDEPENDENT OF THE EEOC GUIDELINES ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES, THE RATIONALE OF THE GRIGGS OPINION REQUIRES
LOWER COURTS TO REJECT THE GLOOR DECISION WHEN AN ENGLISH-ONLY
RULE ADVERSESLY AFFECTS AN INDIVIDUAL BASED ON THE GROUP IDENTIYY
OF HIS NATIONAL ORIGIN
Nine years before the unfortunate Gloor decision and its distrust of for-
eigners who are perceived to have originated from Mexico, the Supreme Court
held, in Griggs v. Duke Power,'3 9 that an employer has a duty to demonstrate
that employment tests that exclude a class of individuals protected from dis-
crimination under Title VII, were job related.'4 ° Even without the benefits of
the EEOC guidelines addressing the issue of English-only rules, both the spirit
and rationale of the Griggs opinion require rejection of the Gloor decision. At
a minimum, Griggs stands for the proposition that an employer cannot impose
English-only rules in the workplace that are not job related on employees
regardless of whether the affected employee is bilingual.' Title VII's prohi-
bition against national origin discrimination does not allow employers legally
to adopt arbitrary English-only rules that disproportionately exclude individuals
from employment opportunities because of their national origin, even if they
are bilingual. An expansive application of the Griggs disparate impact theory
would not limit its rationale to scored tests. "Congress did not intend [that]
Title VII . . . guarantee a job to [employees] regardless of their qualifica-
tions."' 1 12 "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
"I Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 268-69.
138 Id. at 269.
The refusal to hire applicants who cannot speak English might be discriminatory if the jobs they
seek can be performed without knowledge of that language, but the obverse is not correct: if the
employer engages a bilingual person, that person is granted neither right nor privilege by the
statute to use the language of his personal preference.
Id.
139 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
140 lId.
141 See id.
142 Id. at 430.
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to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."' 4 3
A requirement to speak English that is not job related is an unnecessary and
arbitrary impermissible job classification that violates Title VII's prohibition
against national origin discrimination."
Under Griggs, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that an
English-only rule has a disproportionate impact on him because of national
origin, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the required use of
English as a term or condition of employment is job related. "Let us assume
that, as contended by Mr. Garcia, there was no genuine business need for the
rule and that its adoption by Gloor was arbitrary. The EEOC Act does not
prohibit all arbitrary employment practices."' 4 5 Title VII provides that national
origin is an impermissible basis for discrimination. Because language is a
proper proxy for national origin status, under Griggs,14 6 an employee who
wants to demonstrate multicultural diversity in the workplace when the
employer arbitrarily requires English only and that requirement is not related to
the job or any other justifiable business purpose, creates a hostile work
environment.
It is not unusual in today's anti-immigration climate for public officials in
general to display their resentment of undocumented immigrants by passing
resolutions indicating that English is the official language of a governmental
entity or city. On Monday, November 13, 2006, the Dallas, Texas suburb of
Farmers Branch joined the fight against illegal immigrants by unanimously
passing a resolution to make English its official language. 147 When speaking
of the language resolution, Farmers Branch Councilman, Tim O'Hare said,
"People remain[ ] free in Farmers Branch to communicate however they
choose, but that city business would be done in English."' 148 Prior to O'Hare's
most recent anti-immigrant effort, some believed the anti-immigrant mood
reached its peak in September 2006 after Farmers Branch's City Council tabled
certain measures viewed as hostile to undocumented immigrants.149 It is a very
disrespectful act that delays multicultural diversity for either a community or
employer to arbitrarily require an individual not to speak the language of his
national origin without a substantial justification.
14 Id. at 431.
'44 See id.
145 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980).
146 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
147 Thomas Korosec, Dallas Suburb Targets Illegal Immigrants, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 14,
2006, at Al. "A Dallas suburb took the fight against illegal immigration into its on hands
Monday when its City Council unanimously barred landlords from renting to undocumented
tenants, making it the first city in Texas to take such a step." Id.
148 Id. at A4.
149 Id.
Farmers Branch is following the lead of Hazelton, Pa., which earlier this year passed an ordi-
nance to fine landlords who rent to illegal immigrants, deny business permits to companies that
employ them and require tenants to register and pay for a rental permit. A federal judge has
temporarily blocked enforcement of the Hazelton restrictions while he considers a lawsuit by the
American Civil liberties and others. O'Hare contends that illegal immigrants are a driving factor
in the decline of Farmer Branch neighborhoods, and that cities have the right to act because the
federal government has failed to secure its borders.
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Professor Leonard contends that today's wave of immigrants differs from
prior groups because they are not expected to adopt the existing cultural norms,
which include speaking English.' 5 ° "Our present attitude toward non-English
languages, however, is different. There is a tendency to view the old assimila-
tionist mandate as the tool of xenophobic nativists, which is certainly true in
part."'' Today some view language as a characteristic of race or ethnic iden-
tity.152 "The old consensus that persons coming to this country should adopt
English as a badge of citizenship has fallen apart." 15 3 The majority of recent
legal scholarship portrays the efforts by employers to exercise arbitrary control
over their employees' preference for language as wrong.
154
The courts, in contrast, normally have sided with employers in disputes
over workplace language restrictions. Judicial dispositions of workplace lan-
guage claims have been naive at best, and perhaps a bit disingenuous. Garcia
v. Spun Steak is an example of an opinion where the Ninth Circuit has sided
with an employer in a workplace language rights dispute. 1 55 In Garcia v.
Spunk Steak, Judge O'Scannlain's opinion readily concedes that "primary lan-
guage can be an important link to [one's] ethnic culture and identity."' 5 6
American courts must come to understand that the argument for using Title
VII's national origin provision as a restriction on English-only rules in the
workplace remains compelling because choices relating to language point to a
person's right to treatment as an equal.' 5 7 It is a basic, forward-looking Ameri-
can principle to grant each individual equal protection in the workplace.'
58
Professor Drucilla Cornell and Professor William W. Bratton, Jr. contend "that
legal suppression of Spanish is the functional equivalent of Jim Crow."' 159 The
great writer Jorge Luis Borges maintains that he could not have been successful
without the ability to use the Spanish language. 1 60 For Borges, the Spanish
language affected his life in a fundamental way both as "a man and as an art-
150 Leonard, supra note 128, at 59 (citing e.g., JOHN J. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF AMERI-
CANS: How MULTICULTURALISM HAS UNDERMINED THE ASSIMILATION ETHIC 22-63 (1998)
(discussing assimilative forces in American history)).
151 Id. (citing e.g., MILLER, supra note 150, at 64-115 (discussing tension between assimila-
tionist and multicultural philosophies)).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. (citing e.g., Juan F. Perea, Killing Me Softly, With His Song: Anglocentrism and
Celebrating Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REV. 441 (2003); see generally, infra Part IV.
(discussing workplace language restrictions)).
155 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
156 Leonard, supra note 128, at 60 (quoting Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1487).
15' Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton Jr., Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
595, 658 (1999). "Our ultimate conclusion is simple. Because legal suppression of language
and legal sanction of segregation follow from the same cost economics, both Official and
Workplace English impose a form of peonage on Latinos/as that is discriminatory." Id. at
659.
158 Id. at 658-59.
159 Id. at 659.
160 Id. at 676.
In response to the question of whether or not he was "influenced" by the Spanish language, the
great novelist Jorge Luis Borges exclaimed: I am inseparable from the Spanish language. My
dreams, my aspirations as a writer are formed in Spanish. It's no exaggeration to say that the
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ist.' 6 1 Borges' greatness as a writer might not have been realized in a work-
place that required him to write his novels in English under the theory that
Americans could only fully appreciate his work if they were originally com-
posed in English. The Borges interview creates a reasonable inference that an
employer's English-only rule that is not job related may be counter productive
because employees may be more creative and productive in the workforce
when they have the freedom to work in the language of their choice.
However, I think the EEOC's post-Griggs guidelines for an English-only
rule is a natural and necessary result of the Supreme Court's job relatedness
reasoning in Griggs for cases establishing a disparate impact because of
national origin. In 1999, twenty-eight years after the Griggs decision, in EEOC
v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc. ("Synchro-Start"),162 the federal district court
properly articulated the self-evident truth, "any English-only rule unarguably
impacts people of some national origins (those from non-English speaking
countries) much more heavily than others."' 6 3 The EEOC filed suit under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
against Synchro-Start on behalf of a group of employees, alleging unlawful
discriminatory employment practices against employees because of their
national origin. 164 The EEOC contended that Synchro-Start denied its employ-
ees equal employment in the workplace because of their national origin by
commanding them to speak only English throughout the working hours. 165 The
EEOC advanced the argument that Synchro-Start violated Title VII because it
implemented the English-only rule without giving employees adequate notice
of the consequences for violating the rule. 16 6 The EEOC was successful in
defeating Synchro-Start's motion to dismiss. The self-evident truth that an
English-only rule has an impact on national origin was sufficient for the EEOC
to survive Synchro-Start's motion to dismiss, but because the English-only
rules had been held valid in other federal Circuits, the Synchro-Start court gave
an analysis of why it was rejecting the employer's motion to dismiss. 1 6 7
Paul K. Hentzen' 68 appropriately asserts the English-only rule received a
correct interpretation in Synchro-Start. The Synchro-Start decision highlights
the need to continue to refine Title VII to protect against discrimination in the
context of an English-only rule. Hentzen argues that courts should expand the
rationale of Synchro-Start to include strict scrutiny in the statutory burden-
shifting plan Congress intended for disparate impact cases involving a chal-
man I am would not "be" who he is without Spanish. The writer I have become is unthinkable
without the shape it has been given by the great traditions of Latin culture.
Id. (citing interview by Sonia Moria with Jorge Luis Borges, Buenos Aires, Argentina (May
1985)).
161 Id.
162 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. I11. 1999).
163 Id. at 912.
164 Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
165 Id. at 911-12.
166 Id. at 912.
167 Id.
168 Paul K. Hentzen, Note, EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products: The New Face of Disparate
Impact Challenges to English-Only Workplace Rules, 69 U. Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 439,
451 (2000).
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lenge to an English-only rule under Title VII.16 9 Employers should be required
to defend the business necessity justification for an English-only rule under
strict scrutiny. The strict standard gives teeth to the burden shifting formula
under Title VII in a disparate impact claim challenging an employer's English-
only requirement. 170 Courts should recognize that the "ability to comply" stan-
dard for bilingual employees is a discriminatory impairment when the employer
fails to articulate a legitimate business justification under a strict scrutiny
requirement. 171
The three federal appellate courts approving an employer's English-only
rule have rejected Synchro-Start 's argument that English-only rules could
never violate Title VII's national origin provision. 172 These three appellate
decisions applied the English-only rule disparate impact analysis to bilingual
employees. 173 Because plaintiffs alleged that Synchro-Start 's English-only
rule may be invoked against those employees "who speak no English or whose
ability to speak English is limited,"' 74 the bilingual rationale adopted by those
three federal appellate courts to approve an English-only rule does not apply to
those who are not bilingual and speak a native language other than English.
Synchro-Start's English-only rule violates Title VII unless the employer
demonstrates a business necessity for the rule. 175 When employees are obli-
gated "to speak only English during working hours," that requirement could be
presumed to violate Title VII under the "at all times" grouping of English-only
rules under the EEOC guidelines.1 76 Because the EEOC located Synchro-
Start's English-only rule under the "certain times" category the rule is not pre-
sumed to violate Title VII, but rather Synchro-Start as an employer must show
a business necessity for its English-speaking requirement under the EEOC
Guidelines. 17 7 The relevant case law reveals that the EEOC guidelines "consti-
tute the administrative interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforcing agency and
consequently are entitled to great deference.'' 178 In Synchro-Start, the court
espoused the view that Garcia v. Spun Steak improperly rejected the EEOC's
English-only Guideline "because that Guideline presumes in the absence of
other proof that an English-only policy has a disparate impact, thus evoking a
shift to the employer to demonstrate some business necessity for that pol-
icy.' 179 The EEOC believes that an English-only rule produces an inference
169 Id.
170 Id. "The 'business necessity' standard must be required to meet a very high level of
scrutiny to prevent employers from skirting enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
masking the discriminatory purpose of their English-only workplace rules with banal justifi-
cations." Id. at 452.
171 Id. at 453.
172 Synchro-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
173 Id. at 912-13 (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993);
Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985 F.2d 578 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion affirming
findings of law and fact in 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21692, at *7 (M.D. Fla. May 28)); Garcia
v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
174 Id. at 913.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 913 n.7.
177 Synchro-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
178 Id (quoting Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir.1987)).
"9 Id. (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (9th Cir.1993)).
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that a person may be disadvantaged as an employee because of his national
origin. 18  The EEOC's inference of national origin discrimination creates an
evidentiary tie-breaker. 8 '
If the only evidence placed before the fact finder were the existence of such a rule,
with no explanation being proffered either way as to the reason for the rule or as to
the manner in which it actually impacts, that level of evidentiary silence would call
for a verdict in the employee's favor rather than the employer's on the element of
disparate impact. 182
The issue of whether an English-only rule establishes a reliable inference of
employment discrimination in the workplace is strictly a matter of administra-
tive interpretation by the EEOC.' 83 The EEOC has made a good faith effort to
comply with legislative intent by sharing its knowledge and experience on how
to prohibit and or limit national discrimination in the workplace.1 84 Two rela-
tively recent federal English-only rule cases involving courts in the Tenth Cir-
cuit will be discussed briefly.
VI. THE TENTH CIRCUIT REQUIRES AN EMPLOYER TO DEMONSTRATE A
LEGITIMATE BUSINESS NECESSITY FOR AN ENGLISH-ONLY RULE TO DEFEAT
THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE ENGLISH-ONLY RULE CREATES A HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENT
In Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Systems, a New Mexico federal dis-
trict court granted defendant Lovelace Sandia Health Systems' motion for sum-
mary judgment in a disparate treatment claim.185 The plaintiffs contended that
Lovelace's no-Spanish policy represents a per se violation of Title VII.,
86
However, the court concluded that Lovelace, the employer, presented a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory explanation for the no-Spanish policy in rejecting the
challenge of plaintiff employees.' 87
180 Id. at 914.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 lId.
184 Id.
185 185 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (D.N.M. 2005); Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for entry of summary judgment where "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact" and the defendant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgment is appropriate if 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law."' Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995). In applying this
standard, the record and reasonable inferences there from are viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,
149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated
Sec. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990))." 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. Summary
judgment is appropriate against any party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 409 F.
Supp. 2d at 1326.
186 1409 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
187 Id.
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Title VII claims of disparate treatment discrimination based on circum-
stantial evidence are governed by the burden-shifting framework instituted in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.'88 Under McDonnell Douglas, a prima
facie case of discrimination gives rise to a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against an employee.' 8 9 The presumption requires
the defendant to produce an explanation to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie
case. If the defendant provides a satisfactory explanation for its conduct, the
presumption of illegal discrimination "drops from the case."' 90 The plaintiff
has the final burden of persuading the fact finder that the defendant engaged in
prohibited discrimination under Title VII.' 9 ' The plaintiff may win by provid-
ing evidence that the defendant acted either with a discriminatory motive or
that the declared reason for the employer's action was a pretext for discrimina-
tion, i.e., the facially non-discriminatory basis served as a facade for a decision
motivated by unlawful discrimination. 192
The Barber decision pretends to give deference to the EEOC guidelines,
under 29 C.F.R.§ 1606.7(a), regulating the requirement by an employer that
employees speak English at all times, by interpreting that guideline in a manner
that makes it very easy for an employer to evade the presumption that the
English at all time rule is illegal. Under the holding of Barber, an English-only
rule in the workplace does not automatically constitute disparate treatment dis-
crimination under 29 C.F.R.§ 1606.7(a).' 93 A federal court giving deference to
the EEOC guidelines should concede that the EEOC's presumption of illegality
under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. burden shifting requires an employer to
defeat the presumption of illegality by a burden of persuasion rather than a
burden of production.' 9 4 A court that gives deference to the EEOC's guide-
lines would follow the lead of EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc. and
hold that an English-only rule applied at all times is a disparate treatment viola-
tion of Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination.'" 5 It is
evident that the Barber court could not have been serious about prohibiting
national origin discrimination under Title VII and giving deference to the
188 411 U.S. 792 (1993).
89 Barber, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
506 (1993) (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
190 Id. (citation omitted)
191 Id.
192 Id. (citing EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted)).
To establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment based on national origin or color, the
plaintiff must show: (i) that he is a member of a protected class; (ii) that he suffered adverse
employment action; and (iii) disparate treatment among similarly situated employees. Orr v.
City of Albuquerque, 417 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005). The third prong can be met by
showing evidence sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. See id. at 1152 ("The
female Plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination because they have
'presented admissible evidence that Defendant treated at least one non-pregnant employee ...
more favorably than [them].'") (quoting EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d
1184, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 1327-28.
193 Id. at 1336.
194 1411 U.S. 792, 803.
'9' 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D.Tex.2000).
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EEOC Guidelines regarding English-only rules because of its holding that an
employer has produced a legitimate business justification for its English-only
rules at all times based on "complaints made by co-workers that they were
uncomfortable when Spanish-speaking employees spoke Spanish in front of
them."' 96 In a multicultural United States, discomfort in the workplace created
by a person speaking Spanish, or any language other than English, simply can-
not serve as legitimate business justification for an employer's disparate treat-
ment of an employee based on national origin. The court in Barber cited
another case that concluded that an English-only policy in the workplace does
not violate Title VII, in response to the plaintiffs' contention that they were
unaware of any cases upholding such a policy. 197 The Barber court cited to the
case rejecting the EEOC's position that an English-only policy applied at all
times violated Title VII because the Barber court's analysis demonstrates a
hostility to the EEOC rules regulating an employer's English-only policy.
Maldonado v. City of Altus expressly adopted the EEOC's English-only
guideline while addressing the diversity of legal issues that may arise when a
city or governmental employer adopts an English-only rule.' 98 The plaintiffs
were employed by the City of Altus, Oklahoma and appealed a federal district
court's decision that granted defendant's motion for summary judgment for all
claims. Each claim had resulted from the city implementing an English-only
rule for its employees.' 99
196 Barber, 409 F. Supp. 2d. at 1335.
197 Id. at 1337.
The Court is aware of at least one case that has found that an English-only policy applied at all
times did not violate Title VII. See Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.Va.1995).
In Long, the plaintiffs were told not to speak Spanish at the bank except to assist a Spanish-
speaking customer of the bank, similar to the policy here where the plaintiffs were told not to
speak Spanish except to translate. See id. at 942. The plaintiffs in Long argued that an English-
only policy applied at all times was a violation of Title VII. See id. at 940. The court declined to
give deference to the EEOC guidelines, and found that such a policy was not a per se disparate
impact violation of Title VII, and that the policy did not violate Title VII as the defendant had
offered a sufficient business justification. See id. at 940-41.
Id.
In my opinion it appears that the court in Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys. actu-
ally refused to give deference to the EEOC Guidelines involving English-only rules because
it failed to require the employer to meet the burden of persuasion that exists for a legitimate
business justification to over the EEOC's presumption of unlawful discrimination created by
an employer's rule requiring an employee to speak English at all times.
198 433 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2006).
199 Id. First, the plaintiffs alleged claims under both disparate-impact and disparate-treat-
ment and maintained that the English-only policy discriminated against them because of
their race and national origin in contravention of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000e. Second, the plaintiffs alleged intentional discrimination
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Third, the plaintiffs contended that
the city retaliated against them for engaging in conduct protected under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1308. Fourth, the plaintiffs filed claims under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the policy deprived them of equal
protection and freedom of speech.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the following of plaintiffs' claims in favor of
the city asserting disparate impact and disparate treatment under Title VII; intentional dis-
crimination under § 1981; as well as a violation of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The appeals court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the 42 U.S.C.
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The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs alleged enough facts to
support a disparate impact claim of discrimination under Title VII's hostile
work environment theory. 200 The appellate court held that an English-only rule
itself, by evoking hostility by co-workers, "may create or contribute to the hos-
tility of the work environment" under the disparate impact analysis if the policy
is not job related.2°1
"Here, the very fact that the City would forbid Hispanics from using their
preferred language could reasonably be construed as an expression of hostility
to Hispanics. At least that could be a reasonable inference if there was no
apparent legitimate purpose for the restrictions. '20 2 City officials received the
standard complaint that some non-Spanish speaking employees felt uncomfort-
able when co-workers spoke Spanish in their presence.20 3 The appeals court
held that the standard lack of comfort complaint articulated by the city failed to
meet the burden needed to show that the City's English-only policy had enough
business justification to overcome the disparate impact it had on Hispanics
because of their national origin.2 °4
Although the English-only rule may improve communication in the work-
place, Professor Cristina Rodriguez contends that fostering cooperation and sol-
idarity among employees obliges employers to allow linguistic diversity in
some contexts.20 5 Promoting genuine, long-term cooperation in the workplace
depends on what Professor Rodriguez describes as "cultural burden shar-
ing."'20 6 Under the cultural burden sharing theory all participants in the work-
place, not just the assimilating immigrant, take in particular aspects of the
cultural effects of immigration. 20 7 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Maldonado,
by implication, requires an employer to share the cultural burden of immigra-
tion in the workplace by allowing employees to speak Spanish unless the
employer articulates a legitimate business necessity for an English-only rule.2
8
The Tenth Circuit wisely concluded the mere fact that English speakers feel
uncomfortable in the workplace when other employees speak Spanish in front
of them, does not qualify as an adequate business justification under Title VII
for an English-only rule.20 9 I think that, at a minimum, cultural burden sharing
requires employees to accommodate other employees speaking Spanish when
§ 1983 freedom of speech issue and the question of qualified immunity. Id. at 1298. The
plaintiffs contended that the city, a recipient of federal funds, violated Title VI by approving
the English-only rule. Title VI forbids discrimination by federally funded programs. Id. at
1302. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title VI claims
because the plaintiffs failed to either plead or prove that the federal funding received by the
city was for the purpose of making significant employment available. Id. at 1303.
200 Id. at 1304-05.
201 21d. at 1305.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1306.
204 Id. at 1307.
205 Cristina Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1689,
1711-12 (2006).
206 Id. at 1711-12
207 Id. at 1714.
208 See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006).
209 Id. at 1307.
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the employer has failed to establish a business justification for an English-only
rule.2 lo
The plaintiffs argued that the city engaged in intentional discrimination
prohibited by several federal statutes. 2 1 I The identical analytical framework
was appropriate for all plaintiffs' theories of intentional discrimination.2 t2 In
this case the plaintiffs relied on more than just an inference of intent to create a
hostile work environment. "There is evidence that management realized that
the English-only policy would likely lead to taunting of Hispanic employees
... there is evidence that during a news interview the Mayor referred to the
Spanish language as 'garbage.' "213 The Tenth Circuit held the record had
enough evidence of intent to initiate a hostile environment and as a result the
summary judgment on those claims for the city had to be set aside.2 14 It
affirmed the lower court's determination that the plaintiffs were retaliated
against for engaging in conduct protected under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.215 The district court's rejection of the plaintiff's section 1983 First
Amendment freedom of speech claim was affirmed on appeal. Normally, for
an employee's work-related speech to rise to the level of a matter of public
concern, the speech should be voiced with an eye to action, to promote the
public welfare and not just to remedy a personal grievance.2 16 The plaintiffs'
First Amendment claim failed because they did not demonstrate the speech
precluded by the English-only rule involved communications on matters of
public concern.2 17  There is no evidence that the English-only rule was
intended to reduce communications on matters of public concern. 21 8 The Tenth
210 Id.
211 Id.
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As previously noted, Title VII bars discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of race or national origin. Section 1981 provides equal rights
to make and enforce contracts and to the benefits of laws for the security of persons and prop-
erty. Section 1983 prohibits those acting under color of state law from depriving others of their
federal rights; the right invoked by Plaintiffs is the right to equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1308.
214 Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1308.
215 Id.
Plaintiffs claim that their protected conduct was the June 18 letter, written by Sanchez and also
signed by Ruben Rios and Lloyd Lopez. We assume that sending the letter was protected con-
duct for Plaintiffs Sanchez, Rios, and Lopez. But it is too great a stretch to infer that adoption of
the English-only policy was retaliation for the letter. After all, the policy had already been
imposed in the Street Department, where Sanchez, Rios, and Lopez worked - that is why
Sanchez wrote the letter. And the citywide policy was no more stringent than the Street Depart-
ment policy; if anything, it was more lenient.
Because of the lack of evidence of a causal connection, we agree with the district court that
Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claims.
Id. at 1309.
216 Id. at 1310.
217 Id. at 1311.
218 Id.
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Circuit suggested that in certain limited circumstances, speaking Spanish itself
might be considered a matter of public concern.2 19
CONCLUSION
While "official English" has been a controversial subject since America's
beginning, for the first time in American history there is a likelihood that pro-
tection for minority language rights will continue to decline.22 ° In the early
1900s, minority language rights were predominantly local and state con-
cerns.221 In 2007, the English as America's official language pressure groups
speak with national implications for the language rights debate.222  "That
English-only rules have a discriminatory impact on bilingual Latinos ought to
be beyond rational debate., 223 Employers should not be allowed to require
English only in the workplace when that requirement can only rationally be
explained as a prejudice or hostility toward a person because of his or her
national origin. Courts should reject the rationale of the Gloor opinion and
give true deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the national origin provi-
sion of Title VII and its implications on the English-only rule, in order to pro-
mote cultural diversity by protecting the language rights of employees when the
employer fails to produce evidence that an English-only rule serves a legitimate
business purpose. I recommend that courts articulate the need for the employer
always to meet the burden of persuasion in an English-only rule case because
the right to speak one's preferred language should be protected by more than
the production of a plausible business justification.
219 Id. at 1311-12.
Here, we do not question that Plaintiffs take pride in both their Hispanic heritage and their use of
the Spanish language, nor do we question the importance of that pride. What we do question,
because there is no supporting evidence, is that by speaking Spanish at work they were intending
to communicate that pride, much less "to inform [an] issue [so] as to be helpful ... in evaluating
the conduct of government. Id. The dissent suggests that the Plaintiffs' conversations in Span-
ish must be viewed in the context of "an on-going and evolving discussion on race relations."
Diss. at 10. That context might be relevant if there were any indication that the Spanish-lan-
guage conversations began only as part of that discussion. One might then infer that Plaintiffs
were trying to make a point by conversing in Spanish. But nothing in the record suggests that
this was the case. The race-relations controversy is irrelevant in determining the meaning of the
decision to converse in Spanish if it had no impact on the decision. One hearing the conversation
would have no reason to draw an inference that speaking in Spanish now conveyed some new
meaning.
Accordingly, we need not address the focus of the dissent - whether ethnic pride or ethnic
discrimination is a matter of public concern.
Id.
220 Lori A. Mcmullen & Charlene R. Lynde, supra note 11, at 789.
221 Id. (citing Jamie B. Draper & Martha Jimenez, Language Debates in the United States,
in THE REFERENCE SHELF: ENGLISH: OUR OFFICIAL LANGUAGE? 10, 10 (Bee Gallegos ed.,
1994)).
222 Id.
223 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Under-
standing the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1353
(1997). "People whose primary language is Spanish constitute a cognizable group - a 'dis-
crete and insular minority' - who historically have been, and continue to be, subject to
discrimination." Id. at 1354.
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